

Question 1 *MAC Madness*

Evan wants to store a list of every CS161 student's firstname and lastname, but he is afraid Mallory will tamper with his list.

Evan is considering adding a cryptographic value to each record to ensure its integrity. For each scheme, determine what Mallory can do without being detected.

Assume MAC is a secure MAC, H is a cryptographic hash, and Mallory does not know Evan's secret key k . Assume that firstname and lastname are all lowercase and **alphanumeric** (no numbers or special characters), and concatenation does not add any delimiter (e.g. a space or tab), so `nick||weaver` = `nickweaver`.

Q1.1 (3 points) $H(\text{firstname}||\text{lastname})$

- (A) Mallory can modify a record to be a value of her choosing
- (B) Mallory can modify a record to be a specific value (not necessarily of her choosing)
- (C) Mallory cannot modify a record without being detected
- (D) —
- (E) —
- (F) —

Q1.2 (3 points) $MAC(k, \text{firstname}||\text{lastname})$

Hint: Can you think of two different records that would have the same MAC?

- (G) Mallory can modify a record to be a value of her choosing
- (H) Mallory can modify a record to be a specific value (not necessarily of her choosing)
- (I) Mallory cannot modify a record without being detected
- (J) —
- (K) —
- (L) —

Q1.3 (3 points) $MAC(k, \text{firstname}||\text{"-"}||\text{lastname})$, where "-" is a hyphen character.

- (A) Mallory can modify a record to be a value of her choosing
- (B) Mallory can modify a record to be a specific value (not necessarily of her choosing)
- (C) Mallory cannot modify a record without being detected
- (D) —
- (E) —
- (F) —

Q1.4 (3 points) $MAC(k, H(\text{firstname})||H(\text{lastname}))$

- (G) Mallory can modify a record to be a value of her choosing
- (H) Mallory can modify a record to be a specific value (not necessarily of her choosing)
- (I) Mallory cannot modify a record without being detected
- (J) —
- (K) —
- (L) —

Q1.5 (3 points) $MAC(k, \text{firstname})||MAC(k, \text{lastname})$

- (A) Mallory can modify a record to be a value of her choosing
- (B) Mallory can modify a record to be a specific value (not necessarily of her choosing)
- (C) Mallory cannot modify a record without being detected
- (D) —
- (E) —
- (F) —

Q1.6 (3 points) Which of Evan's schemes guarantee confidentiality on his records?

- (G) All 5 schemes
- (H) Only the schemes with a MAC
- (I) Only the schemes with a hash
- (J) None of the schemes
- (K) —
- (L) —

Question 2 *Confidentiality and Integrity*

Alice and Bob want to communicate with confidentiality and integrity. They have:

- Symmetric encryption.
 - Encryption: $\text{Enc}(K, m)$.
 - Decryption: $\text{Dec}(K, c)$.
- Cryptographic hash function: $\text{Hash}(m)$.
- MAC: $\text{MAC}(K, m)$.

They share a symmetric key K and know each other's public key.

We assume these cryptographic tools do not interfere with each other when used in combination; *i.e.*, we can safely use the same key for encryption and MAC.

Alice sends to Bob

1. $c = \text{Hash}(\text{Enc}(K, m))$
2. $c = c_1, c_2$: where $c_1 = \text{Enc}(K, m)$ and $c_2 = \text{Hash}(c_1)$
3. $c = c_1, c_2$: where $c_1 = \text{Enc}(K, m)$ and $c_2 = \text{MAC}(K, m)$
4. $c = c_1, c_2$: where $c_1 = \text{Enc}(K, m)$ and $c_2 = \text{MAC}(K, c_1)$

Q2.1 In which schemes can Bob successfully decrypt m given c ?

Q2.2 Consider an eavesdropper Eve, who can see the communication between Alice and Bob.

Which schemes, of those decryptable in (a), also provide *confidentiality* against Eve?

Q2.3 Consider a man-in-the-middle Mallory, who can eavesdrop and modify the communication between Alice and Bob.

Which schemes, of those decryptable in (a), provide *integrity* against Mallory?
i.e., Bob can detect any tampering with the message?

Q2.4 Many of the schemes above are insecure against a *replay attack*.

If Alice and Bob use these schemes to send many messages, and Mallory remembers an encrypted message that Alice sent to Bob, some time later, Mallory can send the exact same encrypted message to Bob, and Bob will believe that Alice sent the message *again*.

How to modify those schemes with confidentiality & integrity to prevent replay attack?

Question 3 *Key Exchange Protocols*

Recall that in a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, there are values a , b , g and p . Alice computes $g^a \bmod p$ and Bob computes $g^b \bmod p$.

Q3.1 Which of these values (a , b , g , and p) are publicly known and which must be kept private?

Q3.2 Mallory can eavesdrop, intercept, and modify everything sent between Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob perform Diffie-Hellman to agree on a shared symmetric key K . After the exchange, Bob gets the feeling something went wrong and calls Alice. He compares his value of K to Alice's and realizes that they are different. Explain what Mallory has done.

Now consider the following key exchange protocol which can be used by Alice (A) and Bob (B) to agree upon a shared key, K .

Some additional details:

- K , the Diffie-Hellman exponents a and b , and the messages themselves are destroyed once all messages are sent. That is, these values are not stored on Alice and Bob's devices after they are done communicating.

Eavesdropper Eve records all communications between Alice and Bob, but is unable to decrypt them. At some point in the future, Eve is lucky and manages to compromise Bob's computer.

Q3.3 Is the confidentiality of Alice and Bob's prior **Diffie-Hellman**-based communication in jeopardy?